

Nominal Grounding Elements in English: A Domain-based Account¹

Dr. Azad Hasan Fatah
University of Sulaimani
College of Languages
Department of English

Kobeen Raouf Mustafa
MA in Cognitive Linguistics, Institute of Training
and Educational Development in Sulaimani

Abstract

The present study deals with the notion of *grounding* in English, using Langacker's Cognitive Grammar framework. *Grounding* refers to the process of establishing an entity or event in reality. *Grounding* in language is of two types: nominal and clausal. *Nominal grounding*, the subject-matter of the present study, involves an entity that is grounded in reality and realized by means of such grammatical elements as articles, demonstratives and quantifiers. Concerning such nominal grounding elements, the problem facing language users resides in the misuse of such elements in discourse, neglecting the semantic considerations which condition their presence. In this respect, the study hypothesizes that each nominal grounding element has its own function which distinguishes it from the others. This is done by placing the nominal grounding elements in domains, in which each grounding element represents a different facet. The aim of the study, therefore, is to present a thorough account of the nominal grounding elements in the English language. The main conclusion of the study is that nominal grounding elements gather in different domains and stand in contrast to one another when they share the same concept. Each nominal grounding element serves a different communicative purpose.

Key words: Cognitive grammar, domain, facet, grounding, grounding elements

1 Introduction

In communication, the speaker needs to ground his/her speech in reality, and so direct the listener's attention to the intended referent, namely the object or the event s/he describes. To that end, the speaker resorts to the act of grounding. By *grounding*, it is meant the act of anchoring the designated entity to the ground. It is the process whereby the speaker locates the profiled instance from the perspective of the speech event. In Langacker's (1987: 126) view, the term *ground* indicates the speech event, its participants (speaker and hearer) and its settings. In Taylor's (2002:

¹ This article is a modified version of the MA thesis written by Kobeen Rauf and supervised by me.



346), the term *ground* refers to the context of speech event that includes participants, time and place, situational context, previous discourse, and shared knowledge of the participants. *Grounding* is achieved by means of certain elements called *grounding elements*. According to Brisard (2002: xv-xvi), these are elements which serve to establish mental contact with, or direct someone's attention to, a referent which discourse participants are presumably able to determine. Radden and Dirven (2007: 49) believe that grounding is very important to successful communication in that it enables the hearer to identify the intended referent in discourse.

Grounding is of two types: nominal and clausal. According to Langacker (1991b: 122), nominal grounding pertains to questions of identification, i.e. to what degree the participants can locate the thing referred to in reality. Clausal grounding pertains to questions of time and reality. In English, nominal grounding elements include the demonstratives *this, that, these, and those*; articles *the, a, an* and *zero article*; and certain quantifiers such as *all, most, some, no, every, each* and *any*. Clausal grounding elements include tense (present and past), and the modals *may, might, will, would, shall, should, can, could* and *must*. Langacker (2002:7) believes that grounding elements are deictic in nature since they identify a relationship between some facet of the ground and the nominal or processual profile. Langacker (2008: 259) argues that grounding elements specify the status in relation to the ground of the referent profiled by a nominal or the process profiled by a finite clause. Of the two types, the present study is confined to the analysis of the nominal grounding elements. According to Langacker (2008: 264), the primary function of a nominal is to direct the interlocutor's attention to a particular thing in relation to the ground.

2 Theoretical background

This research is rooted in Cognitive Grammar, a theory of language that has been proposed by Ronald Langacker (1987, 1991) as a reaction to Generative Grammar. In Cognitive Grammar, language is inherently symbolic in nature. Grammar comprises three kinds of structure: semantic, phonological and symbolic. Grammar reduces to symbolic relationships between semantic and phonological structure. In contrast to the generative dogma that grammar represents an autonomous component distinct from both meaning and lexicon, Cognitive Grammar stresses that lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum of meaningful structures. It looks at these various aspects of linguistic structure as indivisible or interrelated. Langacker (2013: 3-4) refuses the belief that sees grammar as a purely formal system. Instead, he argues that grammar is based on meaning, and all elements of grammar like vocabulary items are meaningful. In short, grammar allows human beings to symbolize conceptualizations. Language is not the result of a specialized language faculty. Rather, it is, as Evan and Green (2006: 114-15) demonstrate, that the consequence of general cognitive processes.

2.1 Linguistic assumptions

Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008) sums up some linguistic assumptions that characterise Cognitive Grammar:

1. Grammar is symbolic in the sense that a linguistic unit consists of three structures: a



phonological (form), a semantic (meaning) and a symbolic structure which bridges them together. Every linguistic structure is symbolic, be it a morpheme, a word, a phrase, a clause or a sentence. This is exemplified in the article *a*, which is a combination of a phonological structure and a semantic structure linked a symbolic structure. It indicates indefiniteness.

2. Grammar is meaningful in the sense that all linguistic structures are carriers of meaning. Each linguistic structure serves a different communicative purpose. The meaning of a linguistic structure is identified in terms of the domain in which it is embedded. This is exemplified by *some* and *any* both of which activate the domain of indeterminacy, but each of which has a specific role to play in the domain. *Some* represents the facet of proportionality, while *any* represents the facet of randomness.

3. Grammar is usage based in the sense that it is based on usage events. A usage event is an actual instance; a symbolic expression that is performed on a particular occasion for a particular purpose. The grammar of language, i.e. knowledge of language, is based on knowledge of usage events. According to Radden and Dirven (2007: xii), speakers describe a given scene in different ways and so map them onto different linguistic structures. This is exemplified in *I'm running out of time* or *Time is running out*, both of which describe shortage of time.

2.2 Semantic assumptions

According to Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008), cognitive grammar is built on some semantic assumptions.

1. Meaning is dynamic. It emerges and develops in the context of use. Any linguistic unit is polysemous, having more than one meaning. For example, the quantifier *no* has different but related meanings.

2. Meaning is encyclopedic. It is very broad in scope. The meaning of a linguistic expression depends on both linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge. This is realized by means of the domain theory, where a linguistic structure acquires its meaning by representing the portion of knowledge within the domain and by contrast with the other members of the domain.

3. Meaning is conceptualized. The meaning of a linguistic expression has two equally significant sides, conceptual content and construal. Conceptual content refers to the meaning inherent in a situation. Construal refers to the ability of the speaker to describe the content in different ways. This is exemplified by *every* and *each* in *Every/Each boy in the class is clever*. *Every* denotes simultaneity, viewing the boys all at once. *Each* denotes sequentiality, viewing the boys individually.

3 Nominal grounding elements

In Cognitive Grammar, in which the present study is rooted, there is a difference between a noun and a nominal. In Langacker's (1991: 122) words, a *noun* is an expression that profiles a thing in the world, no matter it designates a type or an instance. It is one of the lexical word classes; a 'naming word', referring to people and things as well as to abstract ideas, as in the noun *chair*. A nominal is a noun phrase grounded in reality by means of grounding elements, as in *the chair* or *this chair*. Langacker (2002: 6-8) clarifies the semantic distinction between a noun and a nominal by



stating that a noun merely specifies a type, while a nominal designates a grounded instance of that type. Langacker (2008: 272-73) argues that in English the function of grounding can be fulfilled through various means, including the articles (the, a), demonstratives (this, that, these, those), and certain quantifiers (all, most, some, no, every, each, any). Grounding elements are obligatory grammatical forms linked to the nouns they modify and are tightly intertwined with the grammatical core of the sentence in which they occur. However, they vary in their specific grammatical properties and even in their strategy for singling out a nominal referent.

4 The Cognitive Domain theory

The *cognitive domain* theory has been proposed and developed by Langacker in opposition to the *semantic field theory*. The theory is built on the belief that the meaning of a lexical element can best be defined with respect to the domain to which it refers. According to Langacker (1987:147), 'Domains are necessarily cognitive entities: mental experiences, representational spaces, concepts, or conceptual complexes'. Taylor (2002:439) mentions that a domain can refer to any knowledge configuration which provides the context for the conceptualization of a semantic unit. Hamawand (2007:30-1) believes that concepts do not come into existence as isolated units in the mind, but can only be apprehended in a context of background knowledge referred to as a *domain*. In this way, any concept either complex or not can serve as a domain for another concept. The *cognitive domain* theory possesses some advantages or merits that are shown by Hamawand (2009: 94-95). First, it provides for each lexeme a particular role, concentrates on its actual utilization, and selects the criteria for being a member of the domain. Second, it allows the speaker to depict a situation in various ways, using each time a distinct lexical unit.

According to Hamawand (2009:94, 2011:46, 2016:146), a *domain* refers to a context of knowledge background based on mental experiences. Domain is built on the idea that meaning is encyclopaedic in the sense it covers a large collection of knowledge in great detail. The structure of a domain generally possesses some facets. Any facet is a partition of a domain which is related to a specific concept. Each facet is expounded by a suitable form of language. Lexical concepts cannot be understood independently of the cognitive domains in which they are embedded. For instance, lexemes like *foresee*, *foretell*, and *forecast* assign distinct lexical concepts in the domain of *predication*. Without understanding the domain of predication, one would not be able to use these terms properly. *Foresee* implies predication that is a consequence of normal reasoning and experience, as in *Economists should have foreseen the recession*. *Foretell* implies predication that is made by using religious or magical powers, especially in literature or stories, as in *The prophet had the gift of foretelling the future*. *Forecast* implies prediction that is based on technical or scientific knowledge, as in *They forecast a large drop in unemployment over the next three years*.

Hamawand (2008:21-3) gives reasons for initiating the *cognitive domain* theory within the frame of Cognitive Semantics. Accordingly, he accentuates that most language dictionaries define the lexicon by merely providing the lexical units as separate entries, information about meaning, usage, or register without displaying that many of these units share mutual properties as well as an element



of difference. As a result, dictionaries fail to demonstrate how the elements are related to one another. Evans (2007:61) asserts that the principal function or role of a domain is to give a specific sort of coherent fixed knowledge context against which other conceptual elements can be understood or characterised. For instance, linguistic elements such as cold, hot and lukewarm cannot be entirely portrayed without referring to the domain of temperature.

5 Domains of grounding elements

Applying the domain theory to the present topic, we argue that the domain of a nominal grounding element refers to the background of knowledge, experience and ideas against which the grounding elements are characterized. The domain of a nominal grounding element consists of facets; a facet is a portion which represents a particular experience. Knowledge of a nominal grounding element is encyclopedic; it includes both linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge. The process of gathering nominal grounding elements in a domain is referred to as *configuration*: referring 'the mental act of grouping together a number of linguistic items, be they lexical or grammatical into a cognitive domain', Hamawand (2007: 30, 2011: 46, and 2016: 141).

5.1 The domain of reference

The domain of *reference* is a conceptual background referring to something or somebody either close or far from the interlocutors. In language, it is realized by demonstratives *this*, *these*, *that* and *those*. As stated by Quirk et al (1985: 372) demonstratives have definite meaning like the definite article and the personal pronouns, and therefore their reference depends on the context shared by the speaker and hearer. Traditionally, Radford (2004: 227) describes demonstratives as words which indicate a location closer to or further from the speaker. Radford (2009: 4) clarifies that the demonstratives are called determiners because they determine specific semantic properties of the noun expression that they introduce, marking it as a definite referring expression. Radford (2004: 23) shows that the demonstratives are traditionally known as referential determiners because they determine the referential properties of the noun expression which follows them. However, Hawkins (1978: 156) points out that demonstratives contrast with the article by lacking the supposition of uniqueness.

Cognitively, Langacker (2009: 121), points that demonstratives constitute a kind of mental pointing often accompanied by a physical pointing gesture. Therefore, the speaker performs the act of singling out the grounded referent by using the demonstratives in terms of proximity and distance. Downing and Locke (2006: 424) believe that the demonstratives particularize the nominal group referent by indicating whether it is near *this*, *these* or far away from the reader *that*, *those*, in space or time or psychologically. As Eastwood (2006: 216) clarifies that the demonstratives can be pronouns or determiners. As determiners, sometimes called demonstrative adjectives, they precede a noun.

The concept of *reference* is defined as the act of mentioning of something in speech or writing. Crystal (2008: 407) describes the word *reference* as a term used in grammatical analysis to state a relationship of identity which exists between grammatical units. Diessel (1999: 2) argues that all languages have at least two demonstratives that are deictically contrastive: a proximal



demonstrative referring to an entity near the deictic center and a distal demonstrative denoting a referent that is located at some distance to the deictic center.

Leech (2006: 32) accentuates that in very general terms, the proximal demonstrative determiners *this* and *these* have immediate or nearby reference, while the distal determiners *that* and *those* have non-immediate or more distant reference. From this viewpoint, Demonstratives fall under the domain of *reference*, which is subdivided into two facets. One is the facet of *proximity* constituted by the demonstrative *this* and its plural form *these*. The other is the facet of *distance* which is realized by the demonstrative *that* and its plural form *those*.

5.1.1 The facet of proximity: *this* / *these*

The facet of *proximity* implies nearness in place, time or space to the speaker. Linguistically, this facet is expressed by *this* and *these*. *This* and *these* act as nominal grounding elements. The singular demonstrative *this* denotes singularity. It is used to make reference to a single entity, person or something that is nearer to the speaker. It grounds the referent noun as near. The plural demonstrative determiner *these* denotes plurality. It functions like its singular form *this* but, it only occurs with plural entities. The singular demonstrative *this* is used with both count and non-count nouns, denoting proximity, while the plural demonstrative *these* is only used with plural nouns referring

to near things. Consider the following examples:

- (1) (a) *This* room is too hot.
- (b) *This* water is lukewarm.
- (c) *These* chairs are nice.

In (1a), the demonstrative *this* is combined with a singular count noun referring to a near single entity. In (1b), the demonstrative *this* is used with non-count substance as a near referent, water in the example. In (1c), the plural demonstrative *these* has a proximal reference by occurring with a plural noun, which is chairs.

Langacker (1987: 126) states that the demonstrative *this* is deictic because it contributes predications definiteness and proximity to the speaker. Consider the following examples:

- (2) (a) *This* stool is made of glass.
- (b) *This* car is so luxurious.

In (2a) and (2b), *this* functions as demonstrative and denotes definiteness. In (2a), it makes reference to something that is near and known by the speaker and hearer. In (2b) example, it identifies proximity of a referent which is near for both the speaker and hearer. Moreover Langacker (2008: 283) maintains that the proximity coded by the demonstrative *this* may not only be spatial but may be temporal, functional or attitudinal, as illustrated in (3).

- (3) I really like *this* pencil.

The sentence in (3) might be spatial (the speaker is holding the pencil), temporal (the speaker is holding it now), functional (the speaker is using it), attitudinal (the speaker likes it), or any combination of these.



5.1.2 The facet of distance: *that/ those*

The facet of *distance* implies remoteness belonging to the state or quality of being distant. Linguistically, this facet is expressed by *that* and *those*. These act as nominal grounding elements. Distal demonstratives are used to point that something or someone is spatially remote from the speaker or hearer. The singular demonstrative *that* is deployed to designate a count or nonplural mass noun, an animate or inanimate object which is farther away from the interlocutors. It grounds the referent noun as distant. The demonstrative *those* denotes plurality and functions as its singular form *that* which modifies plural items. Consider the following examples:

- (4) (a) *That* book is interesting
 (b) *That* milk contains no fat.
 (c) *Those* eggs are boiled.

In (4a), the distal demonstrative *that* precedes the count noun *book*, pointing to it as distant. In (4b) *that* precedes the non-count noun *milk* pointing to it as a distant referent. In (4c) *those* precedes a noun, pointing to it as a distant referent.

The demonstrative determiner *that* and its plural form have definite reference like the definite article *the*. In this respect, they point to the entities which are known by both speaker and hearer. Examples are given below:

- (5) (a) *That* horse is so beautiful.
 (b) *The* horse is so beautiful.

In (5a) the demonstrative determiner *that* designates a single item referring to it as a definite referent to the speaker or hearer. In (5b) the definite article *the* designates a single item which identifiable to the interlocutors. The difference is that the demonstrative *that* refers to something seen, unlike the definite article *the* refers to something not necessarily seen at the moment of speaking.

Table (1) the domain and facets of reference

Domain	Facets	Demonstratives	Examples
Reference	Proximity	Proximal Singular: <i>this</i> Plural: <i>these</i>	<i>This</i> car is made in Germany. <i>These</i> carpets are original.
	Distance	Distal Singular: <i>that</i> Plural: <i>those</i>	<i>That</i> boy speaks four languages. <i>Those</i> men helped me last night.

5.2 The domain of identification

The domain of identification is a knowledge background referring to the act of identifying something or somebody. *Identification* can be achieved through definite, indefinite and generic reference. In language, this is realized by means of the articles *the*, *a / an* and *zero*. These act as



nominal grounding elements. The definite *identification* emerges when the article *the* is used to ground an entity or a person as being definite, i.e. identifiable by both the speaker and hearer. The indefinite *identification* is realized when the article *a* or *an* are used to refer to an entity or something as being indefinite i.e. not identifiable to the speaker and hearer. The generic identification is used in generalizing about a class. A class includes a mixture of similar items that have a name. The generic identification denotes generalization in that it describes an item or items as referring to a group in general. In this way, three facets can activate the domain of identification. The first is the facet of definiteness which is expressed by the definite article *the*. The second is the facet of indefiniteness which is expressed by the indefinite article *a/n*. The third is the facet of genericity which is expressed by the definite, indefinite and zero articles.

5.2.1 The facet of definiteness: *the*

The facet of *definiteness* implies designating an identified or immediately identifiable person or entity. Linguistically, this facet is expressed by the definite article *the*. In using the article *the*, both the speaker and hearer make mental contact with the intended referent because of having prior or shared knowledge between them. *The* functions as a grounding element. It is deployed to definitely profile and establish the referent in reality. The definite article *the* is used by the speaker to attract the hearer's attention to the intended or grounded referent. *The* can designate count, non-count and plural nouns. Consider the following examples:

- (6) (a) Aso gave *the* book to his sister.
 (b) *The* birds are drinking.
 (c) *The* cheese is salty.

In (6a), the definite article *the* profiles the referent noun *book* as being identifiable to both the speaker and hearer. Both shared knowledge of the referent. The speaker presupposes that the hearer can identify the grounded referent. In (6b), the definite article *the* profiles plural items, referring to a set of identified birds that are known to the speaker and hearer. In (6c), the article *the* designates a mass noun as an intended referent known by the interlocutors.

5.2.2 The facet of indefiniteness: *a / an*

The facet of *indefiniteness* refers to the quality or state of being indefinite. It refers to the act of identifying something or someone indefinitely. Linguistically, this facet is expressed by the articles *a* and *an*. The articles profile a single referent and identify the intended or grounded referent as being indefinite. Taylor (2002: 354) maintains that, in contrast to the definite article *the*, in using the indefinite article *a / an*, the hearer is not expected to have the ability to uniquely identify the referent. *Indefiniteness* can be divided into specific and non-specific. In the case of a specific reading or interpretation, the speaker may have a specific referent in the mind. In the case of indefinite reading or interpretation, an arbitrary referent is conjured up for immediate purpose. Consider the following examples:

- (7) (a) There was *a* man walking in the park.
 (b) I need *an* egg for this recipe.
 (c) Amanj wants to marry a blonde.



In (7a), the article *a* profiles a specific instance indefinitely. The grounded instance *man* is understood as specific in the mind of the speaker. In (7b), the article *an* profiles an instance which is not in the mind of the speaker. The intended referent *egg* is an arbitrary instance referring to a non-specific. In (7c), the sentence may convey both specific and non-specific interpretations. As Langacker (1991: 103-4) states, under a specific reading Amanj may have a particular blonde in his mind that he wishes to marry, whereas on the non-specific interpretation he does not have a particular blonde in mind.

5.2.3 The facet of genericity: zero article / the / a (an)

The facet of genericity denotes generalization, relating to a class or group of things. Linguistically, this facet is mostly expressed by the zero article or sometimes by the definite and indefinite articles. Zero article is a grammatical device that does not exist in reality like other articles. Phonetically, it has zero realization. This term is commonly used for an article that is omitted before plural and non-count nouns. Consider the following examples:

- (8) (a) Cows give milk.
 (b) Water freezes at 100 Centigrade.
 (c) A computer is a machine
 (d) *The* computer has changed modern life.

The generic meaning or reference can be realized in the examples (8a-d). In (8a), the generic meaning is realized by the presence of the zero article before a plural noun. In (8b), the generic reference is conceived by the co-occurrence of the zero article with a mass noun. In (8c) and (8d), the generic interpretation is revealed by the use of the indefinite and the definite articles.

Table 2: The domain and facets of identification

Domain	Facets	Articles	Examples
Identification	Definiteness	The	She bought a necklace
	Indefiniteness	A(n) Specific Non-specific	A man was looking for him. Jack wants a book.
	Genericity	Zero article Non-count nouns A(n) The	Leopards are mammals. Milk contains fat. A snake is a reptile. The mobile is machine.

5.3 The domain of Quantification

Quantification is understood as the act of quantifying things and situations referring to the designation of a certain magnitude to an instance of a thing. Quantification is divided into two subdomains, proportion and representation. The subdomain of proportion is a knowledge area that designates the profiled entity as some proportion. This subdomain contains four facets: *entirety* which is represented by *all*, *majority* which is represented by *most*, *indeterminacy* which is represented by *some*, and *emptiness* which is represented by *no*. the subdomain of representation is



an area of knowledge referring to a single instance to represent all instances of a type. This subdomain contains three facets: *simultaneity* which is expressed by *every*, *sequentiality* which is expressed by *each* and *randomness* which is expressed by *any*.

5.3.1 The subdomain of proportion

The subdomain of proportion is a knowledge background referring to a part, share or number regarded in comparative relation to a whole. It implies singling out some proportions of the designated entity by means of using proportional quantifiers. Since the entity is a mass, and the profile constitutes some proportion of it. It is expected that proportional quantifiers occur with mass nouns. Langacker (1991:107-8) states that the proportional quantifiers *all*, *most*, *some* and *no* do not involve a similar kind of mental operation but they involve some kind of comparison of the profiled mass and the reference mass with respect to their magnitudes. However, the relation between the quantifiers *all* and *most* is closer to a large extent than other grounding elements *some* and *no*. In general, the proportional quantifiers consist of four quantificational elements henceforth which they form four facets: the facet of *entirety* represented by *all*, the facet of *majority* represented by *most*, the facet of (indeterminacy) *inexactness* represented by *some*, and the facet of *emptiness* represented by *no*.

5.3.1.1 The facet of entirety: *all*

As a grounding element, the proportional quantifier *all* represents the facet of entirety referring to the total or entire proportion of the grounded mass. In Langacker (2009:180) view, the quantifier *all* like other grounding quantifiers does not directly identify the profiled entity. Instead, it characterizes the referent as a large proportion of the designated mass. Consider the following examples:

- (9) (a) *All* birds survived the forest fire.
(b) *All* hot beverages are good for your health.
(c) *All* tea is beneficial for losing weight.

In (9a), *all* characterizes the referent only as an entire proportion of the specified type without identifying any specific individuals. In (9b), *all* indirectly profiles a large proportion of the grounded mass. In (9c), *all* has a total reference designating the mass as portion in a large amount indefinitely.

Furthermore, Langacker (1991: 111) believes that *all* can be construed as a universal quantifier, as shown below:

- (10) (a) All nations have economic difficulties.
(b) All cows are vegetarian.

In (10a) *all* has a universal interpretation profiling the noun *nations* to mean any proportion of the grounded mass which is specified to coincide with the reference mass. In (10b) *all* implies universality in designating the mass noun *cows* as a total proportion of the type.

Among the proportional quantifiers, *all* is one which considered as a full-set quantifier. This



is due to the fact that, as Radden and Dirven (2007:121) point out, *all* may be realized as a collective quantifier. It concentrates on the collection of its items, on each individual item, or on chosen items that are representative of the full set. Let us consider some examples:

- (11) (a) *All* physicians have taken the Hippocratic Oath.
(b) *All* foxes are cunning.
(c) *All* the players left the stadium together.

In (11a), one can refer to *all* as a collective quantifier and imagine a collection of individuals which is identical to the full set. In (11b), *all* subsumes the notion of collectivity of its individual members in general. In (11c) *all* explicitly expresses the collectivity with the collective adverb *together*.

Concerning the quantifier *all*, Taylor (2002: 358-9) clarifies that *all* can be rather odd if it compares with generic statements. As illustrated below:

- (12) (a) Wolves are carnivores.
(b) *All* wolves are carnivores.

- (13) (a) Unicorns have one horn.
(b) *All* unicorns have one horn

In (12a) and (13a), the plural nouns *wolves* and *unicorns* designate the plurality of instances having the feature of generic statements about wolves and unicorns especially this reveals that there is a hypothetical world. However, in (12b), the use of *all* renders the sentence untrue especially by the existence of a vegetarian or toothless wolf. In (13b), *all* may be rather odd since unicorns do not exist in the real world and *all* specifically invokes a reference mass denoting the totality of instances.

Additionally, Radden and Dirven (2007:123) provide comments about the universality expressed by the quantifier *all* as compared to the generic reference and give reason that generic and universal statements involve different conceptualizations of their sets. Examples are provided below:

- (14) (a) Indians speak Indian. [generic reference]
(b) All Indians speak Indian. [universal quantification]

In (14a), the generic reference is revealed based on the reality that so many or almost all Indians speak Indian, approximately 90% of the population. This generalization refers to the whole class of Indians. The universal quantification in (14b) is realized that 100% of the populations speak Indian without exception of those Indians who grew up in another country, or foreigners who have an Indian passport and live in India but speak another language. For this reason, Radden and Dirven believe that this universal claim is not valid or well grounded.

It is not untrue to say that the quantifier *all* can have more than one meaning. That is why Radden and Dirven (2007:122) argue that *all* is a polysemous quantifier used not only with a collective adverb to denote a collective aspect but with a distributive adverb to focus on distributiveness. Consider the example below:

- (15) (a) *All* the actors arrived separately.



(b) *All* the actors arrived together.

In (15a), the quantifier *all* concentrates on its distributive aspect of meaning in conjunction with the distributive adverb *separately*. In (15b), all focuses on its collective aspect of meaning by co-occurring with the collective adverb *together*.

5.3.1.2 The facet of majority: *most*

As a grounding element, the proportional quantifier *most* represents the facet of *majority*. The quantifier *most* indefinitely designates a larger or major proportion of the grounded mass. *Most* as a proportional quantifier denotes the *majority* with reference to a larger set. This facet implies the greater part amount or number, or larger than half of the total. It can be considered as a subset of a set or full set including more than half of the set's constituents. According to Taylor (2002: 356), 'the larger set, or reference mass, against which relative quantifiers are understood, could be constituted by all the possible instances of the type and contextual factor, however may suggest a more restricted set'. Consider the following examples:

(16) (a) *Most* men help with the household.

(b) *Most* men in this quarter own bicycles.

In (16a), *most* implies the larger part or number of men who help at home. In (16b), the number of *men* has been explicitly delimited by the modifying phrase *in this quarter*. With respect to the type specification 'men in this quarter', the sentence probably would be interpreted as an assertion about the *majority* of members of this set. Furthermore Langacker (1991: 108-109, 2002: 35, 2008: 292, and 2009: 181) states that the proportional quantifier *most* designates a large proportion of a set of all instances without specifying particular sets, as shown below:

(17) (a) Shilan likes *most* ducks.

(b) *Most* doves survived the air pollution.

(c) *Most* students pass the exam.

In (17a), the proportional quantifier *most* profiles a set of ducks characterized only as a large proportion of the set of all instances. Here, no particular ducks are singled out. So, no specific ducks are involved. In (17b), *most* implies the majority of doves. According to Langacker (2009: 181), *most ducks* profiles its referent as a large proportion of the contextually relevant extension of the specified type. It does not directly identify any specific individual. One does not know which specific doves are still alive. In (16c), *most* designates more than half of the students indirectly with no specific details about their names.

5.3.1.3 The facet of indeterminacy: *some*

As a grounding element, the proportional quantifier *some* represents the facet of indeterminacy. This facet implies something has the quality or characteristic of being indeterminate, lack of accuracy or certainty. Indeterminacy denotes the impossibility to know about something exactly and definitely. Like other proportional quantifiers, the quantifier *some* designates the grounded mass or its referent as some proportion inexactly. However the proportional quantifier *some* is deployed for smaller proportion. Consider the following examples:

(18) (a) *Some* whales survived the sea pollution.



(b) *Some* fruity drinks are not beneficial for diabetes.

In the sentence (18a) the quantifier *some* characterizes its referent only as some proportion. *Some* does not directly identify any particular individual (whale). Even if one knows that *some* whales survived the sea pollution, one does not exactly know which specific whales are still alive. In (18b), the quantifier *some* describes the grounded mass *fruity drinks* as some proportion, giving no identified or exact kind of drinks.

5.3.1.4 The facet of emptiness: *no*

The facet of *emptiness* refers to the state of containing nothing. This facet is expressed by the proportional quantifier *no*. The quantifier *no* designates the profiled mass as some proportion, characterizing an empty set. Langacker (2008: 292) contends that the proportional quantifier *no* possesses a mental operation of cancellation: though evoked as a virtual entity, this makes it belong to the facet of *emptiness*. According to Radden and Dirven (2007: 130), one cannot think of an absent thing without imagining a state of affairs in which the thing is present so that it may be conceived of as missing. The subset quantifier *no* also evokes the set. Consider the following examples:

(19) (a) *No* senator was pleased with the vote.

(b) *No* whiskey is good for his health.

In (19a) an empty set is described by the quantifier *no*. the quantifier *no* profiles its referent as some proportion denoting a mental operation of cancellation. In (19b), *no* characterizes the grounded mass as an empty set.

5.3.2 The subdomain of representation

The subdomain of *representation* is a knowledge background referring to the act or state of representing an instance as a representative pertaining to all instances of a type. This domain is evoked by representative instance quantifiers such as *every*, *each* and *any* which can only occur with singular count nouns, every, each, any/ man. Langacker(2009:181) believes that the representative instance quantifiers describe distinct strategies for accomplishing a measure of epistemic control. This may be either stronger or weaker relying on how one views it. It is stronger in the sense that the statement pertains to all elements of an open-ended set, not just a single element. It is weaker in the sense that nothing is definitively and directly specified regarding any specific element. Each quantifier evokes a distinct facet: *every* represents the facet of simultaneity, *each* represents the facet of sequentiality, and *any* represents the facet of randomness.

5.3.2.1 The facet simultaneity: *every*

The facet of *simultaneity* refers to the state or quality of being simultaneous. It belongs to how an instance is selected simultaneously to represent and mean all the instances of a type. Linguistically, this facet is expressed by the quantifier *every*. *Every* views group members all at once but still perceiving them as individuals. According to Langacker (2009: 181), the quantifier *every* has a virtual referent rather than an actual. *Every* profile a fictive entity conceived as being representative of some type. Consider the following examples:

(20) (a) *Every* person survived the market fire.

(b) *Every* member was invited for the party.



In (20a), the quantifier *every* designates a virtual instance as being a representative of all members of the relevant extension (person). It simultaneously profiles an entity without identifying any specific or actual person. In (20b), *every* designates a virtual referent in a simultaneous way applying to all instances of the type (member).

Despite the fact that the quantifier *every* only designates a single instance but it can also function as a universal quantifier. In this respect, Langacker (2008: 293) argues that the instance which is designated by the quantifier *every* is construed as being representative. Due to this fact, anything ascribed to this designated instance is thus assumed to be valid for all the instances. Consider the following examples:

(21) (a) *Every* nation has its own culture.

(b) *Every* society has social problems.

In (21a), the quantifier *every* denotes universality. It profiles an instance to represent all instances of the type. In (21b), *every* has a universal interpretation. The expression *every society* is applicable to all societies in the world.

In describing the quantifier *every*, Radden and Dirven (2007: 125) consider *every* as a distributive set quantifier, implying the sense of distributiveness. Since it picks out a single instance of a set and invokes the full set. *Every* bridges the single items to each other until ultimately reaching the complete, collective set. Consider the following examples:

(22) (a) *Every* child has to hold hands with another child.

(b) *Every* room in this hotel has two bulbs.

In (22a), *every child* indicates that the collective set is focused on. In a situation like this one may want to be sure that *every child* is included in the place or room. In (22b), the quantifier *every* implies distributivity in singling out one instance as an individual item and linking them until reaching the complete set.

5.3.2.2 The facet sequentiality: *each*

The facet of sequentiality refers to the state or quality of being sequential. Linguistically, this facet is expressed by the quantifier *each*. The quantifier *each* only occurs with single entity. It profiles an individual instance considered as being representative for all the instances of the type. Langacker (2008: 294) argues that *each* reflects the strategy of examining members sequentially, one by one, until they have all been looked at. Consider the following examples:

(23) (a) *Each* participant filled the questionnaire on time.

(b) He examined *each* one in turn.

In (23a), the quantifier *each* denotes sequentiality and views the participants sequentially one by one. The statement in (23b) has a sequential reference in that *each* designates one to one entity in sequence.

The quantifier *each* can also function as a distributive set quantifier. Radden and Dirven (2007: 125) argue that *each* like *every* is a distributive quantifier in that it selects a single representative instance of a set and then invokes the full set. *Each* concentrates on each individual element of the set by examining it individually. Consider the following examples:



- (24) (a) *Each* pupil has to hold hands with another pupil.
 (b) *Each* kid was vaccinated.
 (c) There is one computer for *each* learner.

In (24a), the quantifier *each* expresses distributivity this is shown by singling out an instance of a set of (pupil) and then invoking the full set. One may want to make sure that she pays attention to the pupil's individual interactions. In (24b), *each* implies distributivity, expressing one to one relation among the individuals. In (24c), *each* denotes the sense of individuality, selecting a single element (learner) of a set and then invokes the full set.

On the other hand, the quantifier *each* can serve as a universal quantifier. Here a question arises, the question is that how can the quantifier *each* function as a universal quantifier if it merely profiles a single instance? According to Langacker (2008: 293), *each* can function as a universal quantifier because the profiled instance by *each* is conceived as being representative. Anything attributed to this profiled instance is thus inferred to be valid for all instances. Consider the following example:

- (25) (a) *Each* tiger has stripes.
 (b) *Each* family has its own regulations.
 (c) *Each* cat is a carnivore.

In (25a), the quantifier *each* denotes universality and function as a universal quantifier. According to Langacker (1991:114), the quantifier *each* implies a restricted universality. The property of stripedness may attribute to a restricted or examined set of tigers not to all tigers. Stripedness is universal within the subset or a particular set. In (25b), *each* also denotes a restricted universality in the sense the expression *each family* refers to a particular set or a restricted subset among all families. Taylor (2002: 357) states that a statement like (25c) would be odd to construe as having a universal reference because there is no way to inspect all cats one by one to ascertain their carnivorous habit.

5.3.2.3 The facet of randomness: *any*

The facet of *randomness* refers to a single arbitrary representative instance pertaining to all the instances of the same type without any specific identification. Linguistically, this facet is expressed by the quantifier *any*. The quantifier *any* randomly designates a representative instance to represent all instances of the type. *Any* is unlike the two mentioned quantifiers *every* and *each* since it occurs with both plural and nonplural mass nouns. Langacker (2008: 294-95, 2009: 181) states that the quantifier *any* is based on random selection. Although the quantifier *any* only profiles one representative instance randomly, all elements have the potential to be chosen. Consider the following examples:

- (26) (a) *Any* student can solve this question.
 (b) *Any* actor whatsoever can play this role.

In (26a), the quantifier *any* randomly designates an arbitrary instance, i.e. student to denote that all students are expected to be selected. According to Radden and Dirven (2007:122) the quantifier *any* in (26b) conveys the meaning of randomness. *Any* highlights the meaning of random selection.



The quantifier *any* like the other quantifiers, can function as a universal quantifier. Langacker (2008: 293) asserts that the quantifier *any* profiles an arbitrary instance which is construed as being a valid representative for all instances. Consider the following examples:

(27) Any nation has cultural ceremonies.

In (27), *any* denotes universality because the designated instance is construed to represent all instances of the type nation, which is here.

Radden and Dirven (2007: 127) argue that the quantifier *any* is a selective quantifier. In this respect *any* makes reference to a randomly selected item of a set and thereby invokes the set as a whole. Unlike *all* and *every*, *any* is largely restricted to non-factual situations, while *all* and *every* might be used in both non-factual and factual situations. The restriction of *any* to non-factual situations follows from its meaning of selectivity. Consider the following examples:

(28) (a) Any trespasser will be prosecuted.

(b) *Any trespasser was prosecuted.

In (28a), *any* implies selectivity and is largely restricted to non-factual situations. The restriction of *any* to non-factual situations follows from its meaning of selectivity. One can, of course, only select an element from a set if we have a choice. In (28b), *any* can no longer be used since *any* is only limited to occur with non-factuality not factuality.

Langacker (2008: 296) mentions an additional property of the quantifier *any* which distinguishes it from *every* and *each*. *Any* can occur with both plural and nonplural mass nouns. Besides it can be used in interrogative, negative, modal, or conditional contexts. Consider the following examples:

(29) (b) I don't see *any* water in the fridge.

(c) Any child can assemble this toy.

In (29a), the quantifier *any* as a determiner is used with a negative statement, designating a mass noun. In (29b), *any* profiles the referent randomly in a positive statement.

Table 3: The domain, subdomains and facets of quantification

Domain	Subdomains	Facets	Quantifiers	Examples
Quantification	Proportion	Entirety	All	All mechanics can use this tool.
		Majority	Most	Most mechanics can use this tool.
		Inexactness	Some	Some mechanics can use this tool.
		Emptiness	No	No mechanic can use this tool.
	Representati-on	Simultaneity	Every	Every mechanic can use this tool.
		Sequentiality	Each	Each mechanic can use this tool.
		Randomness	Any	Any mechanic can use this tool.

6 Conclusion

This study is particularly concerned with nominal grounding in English, adopting the linguistic theory of Cognitive Grammar, a new approach to language analysis which primarily concentrates on meaning. *Grounding* refers to the process of locating an entity in reality. Grounding is realized in language by means of grammatical elements. For nominals, the study has found that the grounding



elements include demonstratives, articles and certain quantifiers. Demonstratives include *this*, *that*, *these* and *those*. Articles include *a(n)*, *the*, and *zero*. Quantifiers include *all*, *some*, *any*, *no*, *every* and *each*. These grounding elements serve to turn simple nouns into nominals. As for the meaning differences, the study has reached the following findings:

1. Although the nominal grounding elements *this/these* and *that/those* belong to the domain of *reference*, they differ in their meaning. *This* and *these* point to proximal entities, while *that* and *those* point to distal entities. Both *this* and *that* are used for pointing, but *this* is used for pointing without physical gesture, while *that* is used for pointing by means of physical gesture.

2. Although the nominal grounding elements *a*, *a/n*, *the* and \emptyset article share the domain of *identification*, they display nuances in meaning. *The* denotes *definiteness*, *a(n)* denotes *indefiniteness*, and the zero article denotes *genericity*. *The* implies *specificity*, designating a particular entity which is specific among a group. *A(n)* implies *non-specificity*. The zero article designates a whole class of entities rather than to a specific instance of the grounded noun.

3. The nominal grounding elements *some*, *no*, *all*, *every* and *each* represent the domain of *quantification*, but they differ in meaning. *Some* and *no* and *all* highlight the subdomain of *proportion*, but they ground their entities differently. *Some* randomly profiles the grounded entity as a small proportion, *no* profiles the grounded entity as empty, and *all* profiles the entirety of the grounded entity. *Every* and *each* highlight the subdomain of *representation*, but they ground their entities differently. *Every* views all the instances of the set simultaneously (all at once), whereas *each* examines all instances of the set sequentially (one by one).

References

- Brisard, F. (2002) 'The Epistemic Basis of Deixis and Reference', in Brisard, F. (ed.) *Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference* (Cognitive Linguistic Research). Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. XI–XXXIV.
- Crystal, D. (2008) *A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Diessel, H. (1999) *Demonstratives Form, Function, and Grammaticalization*. Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
- Downing, A. and Locke, P. (2006) *English grammar: A University Course*. London: Routledge.
- Eastwood, J. (2006) *Oxford Guide to English Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, V. (2007) *A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Evans, V. and Green, M. (2006) *Cognitive Linguistics: An introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Geeraerts, D. and Cuyckens, H. (2007) 'Introducing Cognitive Linguistics', in Geeraerts, D. and Cuyckens, H. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–21.
- Hamawand, Z. (2007) *Suffixal Rivalry in Adjective Formation: A Cognitive Corpus Analysis*. United Kingdom: Equinox Publishing.
- Hamawand, Z. (2008) *Morpho-Lexical Alternation in Noun Formation*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.



- Hamawand, Z. (2009) *The Semantics of English Negative Prefixes*. London: Equinox Publishing.
- Hamawand, Z. (2011) *Morphology in English: Word Formation in Cognitive Grammar*. London: Continuum International Pub. Group.
- Hamawand, Z. (2016) *Semantics: A Cognitive Account of Linguistic Meaning*. London: Equinox Publishing Limited.
- Hawkins, J.A. (1978) *Definiteness and indefiniteness: A Study in Reference and Grammaticality Prediction*. London: Croom Helm.
- Langacker, R.W. (1987) *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar: Theoretical Prerequisites*. (1st Vols).Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 1990. *Concept, Image and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Langacker, Ronald. 1991. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. 2: Descriptive Application*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, R.W. (2002a) 'Deixis and Subjectivity', in Brisard, F. (ed.) *Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference*. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, pp. 1–28.
- Langacker, R.W. (2002b) 'Remarks on the English Grounding System', in Brisard, F. (ed.) *Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference*. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, pp. 29–38.
- Langacker, R.W. (2008) *Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Langacker, R.W. (2009) *Investigations in Cognitive Grammar*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,.
- Langacker, R.W. (2013) *Essentials of Cognitive Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University press.
- Leech, G. (2006) *Glossary of English Grammar*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
- Quirk, R., Leech, G., Greenbaum, S. and Crystal, D. (1985) *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
- Radden, G. and Dirven, R. (2007) *Cognitive English Grammar*. Amsterdam: Benjamins (John) North America Inc.,US.
- Radford, A. (2004) *An Introduction to English Sentence Structure International Student Edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Radford, A. (2009) *English syntax: An introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, J.R. (2002) *Cognitive Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



پوخته

ئەم لیکۆلینە وەه یە تاییبە تە بە بیروکە و چەمکی چەسپاندنی فرەیزی ناوی لە زمانی ئینگلیزیدا بە پشتبەستن بە چوارچیووی ریزمانی ھۆشەکی (ئیدراکی) رۆنالد لانگە کەر. چەسپاندن بریتیە لە پیواژوی دامەزراندن و چەسپاندنی ھەر قەوارەیک یان رووداویک لە ژبانی راستەقینەدا. چەسپاندن لە زماندا دوو جۆرە کە ئەوانیش ناوی وکلۆزین. چەسپاندنی فرەیزی ناوی کرۆکی ئەم لیکۆلینە وەه کە ئەویش بریتی یە لەوہی کە قەوارەیک ناوی دەچەسپیت و درکی پیدەکریت لە لایەن ئاخیوہرانە وە بە ھۆی ئە رەگەزە ریزمانیانە وە کە بەکار دین لە کاتی گفتوگۆدا. رەگەزە ریزمانیەکان بریتین لە ئامرازەکانی نیشانە و ناساندن لە گەل ئامرازەکانی رادە. ئەو کیشە یە پەیوہندیارە بە رەگەزەکانی چەسپاندنی فرەیزی ناوی وە ئەوہی کە بەکار ھیتە رانی زمان ھەلە دەکەن لە بەکار ھیتانی رەگەزەکان لە کاتی ئاخوا تندا بی گویدانە لایەن و دۆخە و اتاییبەکانیانە وە. لەم بارە یە وە، ئەم لیکۆلینە وە یە پشتی بەستووە بە گریمانە یە کە ھەر رەگەزیک ئەرکی خۆی ھە یە و لەوانی تری جیادە کە تە وە. ئەمەش ئەنجامدرا بە وە ی ھەر رەگەزیک چەسپاندنی ناوی خرایە ژیربواریک و اتاییبە وە کە ھەر یەکیکیان نوینەری و اتاییکی دەرکەوتو دەکەن. ئامانجی لیکۆلینە وە کە ئەوہی کە بە تیرو تەسەلی باسی رەگەزەکانی چەسپاندنی فرەیزی ناوی بکات لە زمانی ئینگلیزیدا. گرنگترین دەرئەنجامی ئەم لیکۆلینە وە یە ئەوہی کە رەگەزەکانی چەسپاندنی فرەیزی ناوی کۆدەبنە وە لە ژیر چەند بواریک و اتایی جیاوازدا و ھەر یەکیکیان بەرامبەر بەوی تر دەوہستیتە وە لە کاتی کدا کە بەشداری دەکەن لە ھەمان چەمک یان بیروکەدا و ھەر یەکیکیان بۆ مەبەستیک پەیوہندیکردنی جیاواز بەکار دیت.

المخلص

تتناول هذه الدراسة فكرة ترسيخ العبارة الأسمية في اللغة الأنكليزية وذلك باستخدام نظرية النحو الإدراكي (المعرفي) لرونالد لانكر. الترسيخ يشير الى عملية تثبيت أو ربط الكيان أو الحدث بالواقع. الترسيخ في اللغة ينقسم الى نوعين: العبارة الأسمية والجملة الفعلية. ترسيخ العبارة الأسمية هو موضوع البحث لهذه الدراسة وهي تتعلق بالكيان الذي تتجسد وترسخ في الواقع ويمكن ادراكها بواسطة تلك عناصر النحوية مثلا ادوات المعرفة والنكرة و اسماء الأشارة بالإضافة الى المحددات الكمية. المشكلة التي تواجه ناطقي اللغة تكمن في سوء استخدام تلك عناصر الترسيخ و اهمال العوامل الدلالية. ومن هذا السياق، ان فرضية البحث هي اي عنصر ترسيخ العبارة الأسمية له وظيفة خاصة به والتي يميزه عن البقية. و تم انجاز هذا بوضع عناصر ترسيخ العبارة الأسمية في المجال او النطاق الدلالي و من ثم تمثيل كل عنصر في واجهة مختلفة. هدف البحث هو تقديم عرضا شاملا لعناصر ترسيخ العبارة الاسمية في اللغة الأنكليزية و من أهم استنتاجات الدراسة هي ان عناصر الترسيخ العبارة الأسمية يجتمعون في مديات الدلالية المختلفة بحيث الواحدة تختلف عن الاخرى فيما لو شاركوا في نفس المفهوم. أن أي عنصر من عناصر ترسخ العبارة الأسمية يخدم لأغراض الاتصالات المختلفة.

